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Abstract 
This master thesis aims to investigate the profitability of momentum and 
contrarian investment strategies in Chinese “A” share market listed on both the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) from 
2002 to 2011. We examined 81 strategies with various horizons based on weekly 
stock return. Results suggest that contrarian strategies are more likely to be 
successful than momentum strategies. Short- and medium-term contrarian 
strategies yield statistically significant abnormal profit up to 2.2% per month, 
however, profitability decreases as holding period gets longer. Further analysis 
indicates that (1) time-varying market risk could be a source of contrarian profits, 
but not a major one; (2) Overreaction does not contribute to contrarian profits; (3) 
the lead-lag structure effect is mainly responsible for contrarian profits.  
 
Keywords:   contrarian strategy, China “A” shares, overreaction, lead-lag 
structure, decomposition model.  
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1. Introduction  
The profitability of trading strategies that based on past return patterns has 
attracted much interest in academics. Among them, contrarian strategies based on 
price reversals or momentum strategies based on price continuations are the most 
popular. Significantly successful short- and intermediate-term momentum 
strategies, and long-term contrarian strategies have been well documented in the 
stock markets of developed countries, such as the U.S. and England, dating back 
to the 1980s. Other researches also focus on the emerging markets, especially in 
Asia. In the China stock market, short-term contrarian and intermediate 
momentum effect was found to have distinct pattern from that of the western 
countries. Considering such findings were discovered nearly10 years ago, factors 
such as regime shifts could have already led to much variation in the patterns. In 
this paper, we attempt to investigate the short-, intermediate- and long-term 
contrarian strategies in the Chinese “A” share markets from 2002 to 2011. We 
also divide our sample into sub-periods to examine the effects on abnormal profits 
on the financial crisis and the on-going chaos since 2007. We believe our analysis 
will be of interest to both technical traders and academics.  
The reason that we are interested in the Chinese market is that it is a special 
market as Hu (1999) points out, especially in government regulation and investor 
compositions. As shown in the SZSE Fact Book 2009, individual investors, with 
only rudimentary financial knowledge, are still the dominance of China stock 
market despite the fact that the percentage of institutional investors is increasing 
throughout the years. Stock trading in China is sometimes labeled the term “stir-
frying stocks” as individual stocks are traded with market rumors. Kang et al. 
(2002) also suggest that syndicate speculators may find it much easier to 
manipulate the sentiment in small stocks, giving rises for the phenomenon that 
returns of small firms lead returns of large firms. Such behaviors could lead to 
short-term momentum or long-term contrarian profits. All these have significant 
different implications to momentum/contrarian strategies in China. 
Moreover, China is among the countries awaiting investigations for its low 
correlation with global market. Byströma (2011) reports that China’s stock market 
has much weaker reaction to the global news. Sharma (2011) examines the Asian 
economies and documented that China is the least positively related to the US 
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market. All these have the implication that the China stock market will provide 
better diversification benefits for international investors than other markets, 
especially big sovereignty funds such as the Norwegian Government Pension 
Fund – Global, who, as a matter of fact, is increasing its exposure on emerging 
markets. Hence, the investigation of proper investment strategy in China stock 
market is still attractive and interesting to the global investors and researchers. 
In addition, trading environment in China has gone through several profound 
reforms ever since 2000. The result is a gradual and more standardized 
improvement on related regulations. For example, stricter IPO regulations and 
trading rules were exercised in 2001. B shares were opened for domestic 
investors, which were limited only to foreign investors prior 2001. The first open-
end fund was traded in 2001. Also, the index futures became tradable and short-
selling was allowed for qualified institutional investors in 2010. The China stock 
market is getting more and more regulated, transparent and mature. As a result, 
abnormal profitability could display new patterns.  
We implement and analyze a wide spectrum of contrarian investment strategies 
from 2002 to 2011, as well as its two sub-periods, by using all the “A” shares we 
can find on the China stock market. In sharp contrast to the findings in the US and 
the European markets, but similar to the evidences that Chou et al. (2007) report 
in the Japanese market during 1975 to 1997, we find that contrarian strategies are 
profitable on all the 81 strategies we examine, and the most statistically 
significant contrarian profits cluster around short-term and the intermediate-term, 
from 1 week to 20 weeks. Contrarian profits are generated up to 2.2% per month 
and decrease when strategy’s holding period gets longer. Our findings are distinct 
from that from Kang et al. (2002), who report short-term contrarian and 
intermediate-term momentum profit in the Chinese “A” share market during 1993 
to 2000. The investigation into the sub-periods shows that momentum strategies 
are gradually losing ground to contrarian strategies over time, and the discovery of 
contrarian profits are moving towards longer formation periods after the financial 
crisis. We also find that time-varying market risk, considering unequal risk 
embedded in winner portfolio and loser portfolio, is one of the sources 
contributing to contrarian strategy, but not a major one. Surprisingly, overreaction 
is exanimated not a source of the contrarian profit, and nearly all the stocks show 
price continuation but not price reversal. The finding of lead-lag structure effect is 
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consistent with Kang et al. (2002) that small stocks exhibit leading pattern 
towards large stocks in terms of return. An empirical decomposition of the 
contrarian profits suggests that lead-lag effect is the sole determinant of expected 
contrarian profit as compared to the US market whose contrarian profits are 
mostly attributed to overreaction. Mainly speaking, our results indicate that 1) the 
Chinese “A” share market is similar to the Japanese market but distinct from the 
US market in terms of contrarian/momentum patterns; and 2) the market is more 
rational and the participants are more long-term oriented compared with 10 years 
ago. 
The rest of this thesis is organized into five sections. Section 2 reviews previous 
findings by other researchers regarding contrarian strategy and the possible 
sources of contrarian profit. Section 3 describes the data resources and 
methodologies for conducting the research. Section 4 presents our profit finding 
of contrarian strategies in China stock market both in the overall sample and the 
two subsamples (dividing point: 09 August 2007). Section 5 reports the robustness 
tests for time-varying risk factor, overreaction and lead-lag structure effect. 
Section 6 investigates the sources of contrarian profits by an extended 
decomposition model on Lo and MacKinley (1990) developed by Chou et.al 
(2007). Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
In accordance with the efficient market hypothesis, as refined by Eugene Fama 
(1970), security prices, at any time, fully reflect all available information in an 
efficient market. Price changes only to reflect new information. As new 
information is unpredictable, price changes should be unpredictable. Thus, price is 
following a random walk and no investment pattern can be discovered for the 
purpose to capture excess return. It means that no investors can outprofit the 
others by predicting the stock returns. Among the three versions of EMH, the 
weak-form hypothesis suggests that all historical prices and returns have been 
reflected on current prices. Thus no technical analysis can predict or help to form 
strategies to beat the market. However, empirical tests using serial correlation on 
stock returns discover that stock market returns have a tendency to be related to 
past stock returns, contradicting to the weak-form EMH. Considerable quantities 
of financial literatures, since 1980s, have shown that historical stock returns have 
predictability for future stock returns on different time horizons, challenging the 
weak-form EMH in the tested markets. For instance, Lo and Mackinlay (1988) 
report weak positive serial correlation on short horizon (1-6 months) that positive 
past return leads to positive current return when examining the US market index. 
For individual securities, reversal effect seems more common as indicated by 
Lehmann (1990) and Jagedeesh (1990), as U.S. stocks with positive past return 
tend to reverse and perform poorly later on. Moreover, portfolio of US stocks 
experiences continuation (momentum) effects on intermediate horizon (3-12 
months) as documented by Jagedeesh and Titman (1993). On the other hand, 
Debondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) find out that in US market reversal (contrarian) 
effect happens on long horizon (3-5 years) that recent loser portfolios outperform 
recent winners.  
These findings on continuation and reversal effects imply that abnormal profits 
can be exploited by forming momentum and contrarian strategies. A momentum 
(strengthen) strategy is to buy the portfolios consisting of stocks that performed 
well previously and to sell the portfolios consisting of stocks that performed 
poorly (buy past winner and sell past loser). While a contrarian strategy is to do 
the opposite with the belief that prior winner will become current loser. Using 
proceed from short-selling to invest, a zero initial investment can be constructed if 
the transaction cost is assumed to be zero.  
Master Thesis GRA19003                                                                        03.09.2012 
 8 
Because of their arbitrage nature, momentum and contrarian strategies have been 
first tested and documented profitable to some extent in the U.S. market as shown 
above. Recently, Parhizgari and Nguyen (2008) also come up with considerable 
support for the presence of the momentum and contrarian strategies in the 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) market. The momentum or contrarian 
effects are found in non-US markets as well. Ahmet and Nusret (1999) discover 
long-term contrarian effects in the stock markets of seven non-US industrialized 
countries. Rouwenhorst (1998) reports momentum profits in 12 European equity 
markets. Schiereck et al. (1999) find momentum profits in the intermediate-term, 
and short- and long-term contrarian profits in the Germany equity market. Chang 
et al. (1995) reports short-term contrarian effects in the Japan stock market. Chou 
et al. (2007) further finds supports on contrarian profits in Japan stock market 
especially in very short and very long periods. There are a growing number of 
researches on emerging markets as well. Rouwenhorst (1999) discovers 
momentum profits in six out of twenty emerging equity markets. Hameed and 
Ting (2000) document short-term contrarian profits in the Malaysia stock market 
while Locke and Gupta (2009) report contrarian strategies profitable in the Indian 
market.  
Specifically for China market (including Hong Kong), a few valuable literatures 
regarding the discovery of momentum or contrarian effects have captured 
researchers’ interest. Ding et al. (2008) document momentum and contrarian 
profits in seven Pacific-Basin markets including China. They also report that this 
effect is especially pronounced in Hong Kong. Hameed and Yuanto (2000) find 
small momentum profits in six Asian stock markets covering China. Kang et al. 
(2002) document significant profits on short-term contrarian effect and 
intermediate-term momentum effect in China for the period 1993 to 2000. 
Investigating only the Shanghai stock exchange, Naughton (2008) suggests 
substantial profitability on momentum strategies from 1995 to 2005.  On the other 
hand, Li et al. (2010) suggest no momentum profitability for the period 1994 to 
2007 while coming up with the conclusion that the short-term contrarian strategies 
can capture, on average, 12% abnormal return annually. Du and Nie (2007) find 
evidences supporting profitable long-term (18-36 months) contrarian effect while 
rejecting intermediate momentum profits. We extend the investigation of the 
contrarian effect in China market to the period of financial crisis based on the 
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method applied by Kang et al. (2002), as this is the first paper to systematically 
investigate the momentum/contrarian profits in China market. 
How can momentum strategies or contrarian strategies beat the market as the 
empirical studies have shown? Former researchers try to excavate explanations to 
momentum and contrarian profits, of which two streams, behavioral irrationality 
and stock market efficiency, emerge to be dominant.  
Among the alternative sources for the abnormal return brought along by 
contrarian strategies, investor’s overreaction to information is the most notable 
one. As DeBondt and Thaler (1985) illustrate, overreaction hypothesis suggests 
that extreme price movement leads to an opposite-direction price movement later, 
which matches the magnitude of the initial price movement. The overreaction 
hypothesis is tested predictable on long-term contrarian profitability in the US 
market. It says that investors tend to overreact with bad, firm-specific news. The 
pessimistic attitude drags down the price. As what goes down must come up, the 
negative serial dependence of individual security raises the possibility for past 
losers to outperform past winners. Contrarian strategy is designed to exploits this 
profit. The hypothesis was supported by Lehmann (1988) and Delong et al. (1989). 
Later, Bacmann and Dubois (1998) test the French market and find out that short-
term contrarian effect is also explainable by overreaction. The result was 
supported by Mun et al. (1999) with evidences from the French and German 
market. 
Another possible explanation for contrarian effect is documented as “lead-lag 
structure” or “cross effects among the securities” by Lo and Mackinlay (1990). 
Their logic is as follows: Assume a market consisting with only two negatively 
correlated stocks A and B. If stock A obtained higher returns than stock B in the 
previous period, contrarian strategy (buy winner and sell loser) will benefit with 
no existence of market overreaction. They suggest that some stocks react more 
quickly than others in the US market, resulting in “return of large stock generally 
leads those of smaller ones”. They also report that the lead-lag effect accounts for 
more than 50% of the abnormal contrarian return as indicated by their model. 
However, their suggestion is refuted by Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) who 
decompose the contrarian profits and find out that stock price reacts with delay to 
common factors while overreact to firm-specific information. They further 
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document that the size-related lead-lag effect arises only when investor delay 
reactions to common factors. They conclude that overreaction to firm-specific 
information is the main contribution to contrarian profits.  
A Third source of contrarian profits can be time-varying common factors. As 
highlighted in the research conducted by Conrad and Kaul (1998), cross-sectional 
dispersion in the mean return of individual securities (in the portfolio being 
examined) varying by time is the important determinant for short-term contrarian 
profits. In determining the long-term contrarian profits, Chan (1988) suggests that 
both the risk of individual stock (represented by beta) and the market risk 
premium change over time, which give rises to a reverting mean of expected 
return. What is more, the fact that prior losers become riskier implies higher 
expected return, from which contrarian strategies may benefit. Zarowin (1990) 
reports firm-size discrepancy is the main reason for long-term contrarian profits. It 
is documented that prior loser can outperform winner because of its smaller size 
but not of overreaction. Some other reasons lay on measurement errors due to bid-
ask spread, non-synchronous trading and liquidity as reported by Park (1995), 
Ball et al. (1995), Conrad et al. (1997).  
Lastly, for better understanding the composition of contrarian profits Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990) developed decomposition model for the expected contrarian 
profits. The model could be used to quantify to what extent the profit is resulted 
from cross-sectional correlation and autocorrelation. However, as Chou et al. 
(2007) point out, that the length of forming and holding period could potentially 
affect the contrarian/momentum profits. The choices of the composition in the 
portfolio are determined by the formation period as past winners and past losers 
are chosen. The return of the portfolio then depends on the holding period 
selected, as evidenced by Jegadeesh and Timan (2001). However, the classic 
decomposition for the expected contrarian profits in Lo and MacKinlay (1990) 
and Jegadeesh and Timan (1995) only considers cases of symmetric lengths of 
formation and holding period. Chou et al. (2007) extend the decomposition 
method developed by Lo and MacKinlay (1990) by allowing unsymmetrical 
lengths. As far as we know, this model has never been applied in the China 
market, we therefore contributes to the literature by utilizing this advanced model 
from Chou et al. (2007) in our paper.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data description 
In this thesis, we obtain weekly stock returns1 of Chinese “A” shares listed on 
both the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) from 2002 to 2011. These data are sourced from Thomson Reuters 
DataStream. The first week return of any newly listed company is eliminated 
because of the substantial underpricing and irregular returns in IPOs in China (see 
Sun and Tong, 2000), so that abnormal returns from IPOs would not influence our 
results. Our sample contains 2386 firms ever listed within the sample period. 
There were 1127 firms listed in the China stock market at the beginning of 2002 
and 2369 firms with valid trading data at the end of 2011. Totally, it contains 521 
weekly periods in overall sample.  
In order to simulate the historical trading environment and avoid survivorship 
bias2, we include non-active stocks that were delisted or suspended for some 
period. However, disappearing trades3 are found due to various reasons, such as 
merger and acquisition, delisting or investigation on management issues. This 
may result in the problem of non-synchronous trading, a term describing a non-
synchronous reactions to the same systematic news due to non-trading of some of 
the stocks. The treatment for non-synchronous trading will be discussed later in 
section 3.2. Also as the zero return figures may distort our stock formation 
process since zero returns cannot be ranked in between each other, we modify 
these zero returns into non-numeric data so that it will not be influencing our 
portfolio formation. 
                                                
1 Stock return is based on total return index of each firm starting from Tuesday, January 2nd, 2002 
and ends at Monday, December 28th, 2011. To calculate the weekly return, we apply continuously 
compounded method (logarithmic return). Total return index for each firm is including return 
adjusted by dividends, rights offering and other distributions. 
2 Survivorship bias occurs when failed companies (no longer exist or delisted) are excluded from 
the performance studies. Results from studies would become higher than the true value because 
only the successful companies are taken into account.  
3 Disappearing trades occur when trading volume equals zero, but stock’s total return index 
remains the same as the previous period. Thus, stock’s return remain zero based on the calculation.  
Master Thesis GRA19003                                                                        03.09.2012 
 12 
Our data also include market capitalization (in thousands Yuan) and stock 
turnover by volume (in thousands time). Market capitalization is used for size-
related lead-lag structure effect on contrarian profits. We are also interested in the 
question: whether any specific contrarian strategy may capture abnormal return in 
the global financial crises period. We divided the whole period into two 
subsamples: January 2nd, 2002 to August 9th, 2007, and August 10th, 2007 to 
November 2011, where the dividing point is the beginning of the global financial 
crisis represented by BNP Paribas’ ceasing investment in US mortgage debt. The 
comparison between subsamples and entire sample may generate interesting 
results.  The detail descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
  
Weekly Stock 
Return 
Turnover 
by Volume Market Value 
Overall sample From 2002-1-2 to 2011-12-28 
Mean -0.0031 34726.28 9567.57 
Median -0.0011 24031.40 8526.59 
Skewness -0.1493 2.25 0.57 
Excess kurtosis 3.8520 9.19 0.36 
Standard deviation 0.0699 36387.13 3939.64 
Minimum -1.0154 0 76 
Maximum 2.7972 55608430 6475260 
Average Observations 412 412 412 
First subsample From 2002-1-1 to 2007-8-9 
Mean 0.0030 19310.90 6688.92 
Median 0.0028 12028.17 6242.13 
Skewness -0.3326 1.53 1.28 
Excess kurtosis 5.4147 5.56 2.59 
Standard deviation 0.0697 24424.58 2325.21 
Minimum -0.9808 0 76 
Maximum 2.4923 55608430 1555966 
Average observations 235 235 235 
Second subsample From 2007-8-10 to 2011-12-28 
Mean -0.0040 42487.42 11225.83 
Median -0.0003 33370.00 10556.04 
Skewness -0.1489 1.94 0.29 
Excess kurtosis 2.0670 6.40 -0.05 
Standard deviation 0.0730 32921.53 3558.04 
Minimum -1.0154 0 76 
Maximum 2.7972 8454702 6475260 
Average observations 167 167 167 
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From above, all returns are negatively skewed and leptokurtic. Weekly stock 
return is averagely -0.3% in overall sample. Mean return (0.3%) in first subsample 
(so called ex ante crises period) is way higher than the one (-0.4%) in second 
subsample (so called crises period). Relatively higher standard deviation in second 
subsample (0.073) implies unusual risk embedded in this period. The turnover in 
second subsample (42487.42 thousands) is also the highest among the samples. 
The highest market capitalization (6475.26 million) is observed in the second 
subsample period. The different figures summarized in three samples may result 
in surprising finding for the contrarian and momentum profits. 
To construct the Sharper-Lintner Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) formed by 
Chan (1988) for testing time-varying market risk (discussed in Section 5.1), we 
need market risk factor. DataStream China “A” DS market index (weekly total 
return) is used as proxy for weekly market return. Weekly market return is 
computed with continuously compounded method. And China interbank one-
week offered rate, obtained from DataStream as well, is used as risk free rate. 
Risk free rate data is transformed from annualized rate into weekly rate.  Details 
related to the model will be illustrated in section 4.  
 
3.2 Portfolios construction methodology 
To test the existence of momentum and contrarian profits. Portfolios are formed 
based on the methodology employed in Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993), Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), and closely to Kang et al. (2002). 
At the beginning of each week t, all stocks are ranked based on their returns from 
the previous F-week formation period in an ascending order. Five equal-size 
quintiles portfolios are then formed and each portfolio’s equal-weighted average 
return for F-week period is computed. The portfolio with highest equal-weighted 
average returns is defined as the winner portfolio and the lowest is defined as the 
loser portfolio. The quintiles in between the loser and winner portfolios are given 
number orders in ascending order (2, 3, 4), but they are not examined in our 
thesis. Nine formation periods are taken into considerations, thus F=1, 2, 4, 8, 12, 
16, 20, 26, 52 in terms of weeks. Notice that we require stocks to be listed, 
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namely stocks should have valid return so that they can be identified as winners or 
losers4. 
Each equal-size quintile portfolio under various formation periods is continued to 
be held for H weeks (H refers to holding period). We consider using the same 
horizons in the formation period as in the holding period, thus H=1, 2, 4, 8, 12, 
16, 20, 26, 52. By then, a spectrum of F-H strategy is formed. In general we have 
81 (9x9) different investment strategies. Equal-weighted average portfolio return 
for holding period generated from each quintile is what we attempt to compare 
between winner portfolios and loser portfolios for each F-H strategy. The 
difference between the returns of winner and the loser portfolio is namely the 
profit from buying winner and selling loser, which constructs the momentum 
strategy. If the difference in holding period return is significantly different from 
zero and it is positive, we can conclude that momentum profits exist. And if it is 
significantly negative, then it implies contrarian strategy is profitable. In addition, 
following the design of Kang et al. (2002), we employ overlapping data to 
increase our test power (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). For example, when 
constructing 4-week return, the first return covers 1st week to 4th week and the 
second return covers 2nd week to 5th week, and so on.  
To avoid the possible measurement error that may arise from bid-ask spread, price 
pressure due to illiquid markets, and non-synchronous data, one trading day 
between portfolio formation and holding periods for all investment strategies is 
skipped (Kang et al., 2002; for similar treatment, see Chan et al., 1999; Lehmann, 
1990). For instance in the formation period, a week may begin on Tuesday and 
ends on the following Wednesday (if the Wednesday is not a trading day, then the 
next trading date is used). Subsequently for the holding period, a week begins on 
Wednesday and ends on Thursday (if Wednesday is not a trading day, then we 
will use the next trading day).  
 
  
                                                
4 If return equals zero due to disappearing trades, which has been transformed into non-numeric 
data, this stock would not be taken into the ranking process at time t.  
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4. Profitability of Momentum and Contrarian Strategies 
Table 2 reports the profitability of 81 equal-weighted zero investment strategies 
for overall sample. The table consists of 9 parts, differing by the 9 formation 
periods. The first two rows of each part report the return of winner stocks 
followed by the loser stocks during the holding period. Then the W-L row reports 
the profit from buying winners stocks and selling losers stocks for 9 different 
holding periods during the investigating period. The t-statistics are also reported 
for the profitability figure of each strategy. If the profit from W-L is positive and 
significant, there exists momentum profit. If it is negative and significant, then it 
is contrarian profit. 
For the overall sample from 2002 to 2011, the average return of the loser portfolio 
is larger than that of the winner portfolio. Among the 81 strategies, 19 strategies 
have negative profits (1-1, 4-4, 4-8,4-12, 8-1, 8-2, 8-4, 8-8, 8-12, 8-16, 12-1, 12-2, 
-12-4, 12-8, 12-12, 16-4, 16-8, 20-4 and 20-8) that are statistically significant 
different from zero. As a result, all the 19 strategies are contrarian strategies. The 
19 strategies are located within 6 formation periods (1-H, 4-H, 8-H, 12-H, 16-H 
and 20-H) and 6 holding periods (F-1, F-2, F-4, F-8, F-12 and F-16), indicating 
the existence of short- and intermediate-term contrarian profits. The results are a 
bit different from Kang et al. (2002), where they find short-term contrarian and 
intermediate-term momentum profits in the China “A” share market from 1993 to 
2000.  
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Table 2. Contrarian profitability summery for overall sample 
 Strategy 1-1 1-2 1-4 1-8 1-12 1-16 1-20 1-26 1-52 
Winner -0.0158 -0.0049 -0.0044 -0.0022 -0.0011 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0013 0.0031 
Loser 0.0064 0.0009 0.0023 0.0034 0.003 0.003 0.0034 0.0035 0.0037 
W-L -0.0221 -0.0059 -0.0067 -0.0056 -0.0042 -0.0033 -0.003 -0.0022 -0.0006 
t-stat. -1.8510*  -0.6864  -1.0517  -1.2442  -1.0488  -0.9305  -0.9094  -0.7147  -0.2612  
Std W 0.0473 0.2176 0.4665 0.683 0.8264 0.9091 0.9535 0.9765 0.9882 
Std L 0.0491 0.2216 0.4707 0.6861 0.8283 0.9101 0.954 0.9767 0.9883 
F stat. 0.9300  0.9453  0.9805  1.0052  0.9642  0.9772  0.9398  0.9685  0.9920  
Strategy 2-1 2-2 2-4 2-8 2-12 2-16 2-20 2-26 2-52 
Winner -0.0077 -0.0028 -0.0047 -0.0033 -0.0018 -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0008 0.003 
Loser 0.0038 0.0005 0.0029 0.004 0.0033 0.0028 0.0031 0.003 0.0035 
W-L -0.0114 -0.0033 -0.0076 -0.0073 -0.0051 -0.0035 -0.0034 -0.0022 -0.0005 
t-stat. -0.9554  -0.3888  -1.1953  -1.6003  -1.2853  -0.9717  -1.0128  -0.7065  -0.2174  
Std W 0.0466 0.2158 0.4645 0.6816 0.8256 0.9086 0.9532 0.9763 0.9881 
Std L 0.0498 0.2231 0.4724 0.6873 0.829 0.9105 0.9542 0.9768 0.9883 
F stat. 0.8749  0.8571** 0.9079  0.9797  0.9386  0.9464  0.9061  0.9506  0.9779  
Strategy 4-1 4-2 4-4 4-8 4-12 4-16 4-20 4-26 4-52 
Winner -0.0096 -0.007 -0.0082 -0.0052 -0.0031 -0.0018 -0.0011 0.0003 0.0028 
Loser 0.0079 0.0057 0.0072 0.0057 0.0044 0.0037 0.0039 0.0034 0.0037 
W-L -0.0176 -0.0127 -0.0154 -0.0109 -0.0075 -0.0055 -0.005 -0.0031 -0.0009 
t-stat. -1.4528  -1.4973  -2.4252**  -2.4008** -1.9045* -1.5415  -1.4973  -1.0103  -0.3775  
Std W 0.0469 0.2165 0.4652 0.6821 0.8259 0.9088 0.9533 0.9764 0.9881 
Std L 0.0504 0.2244 0.4737 0.6883 0.8296 0.9108 0.9544 0.9769 0.9884 
F stat. 0.8652  0.8554**  0.9059  0.9551  0.8928  0.8871  0.8542 ** 0.9000  0.9521  
Strategy 8-1 8-2 8-4 8-8 8-12 8-16 8-20 8-26 8-52 
Winner -0.011 -0.0085 -0.0083 -0.0053 -0.0033 -0.0021 -0.0012 0.0001 0.0028 
Loser 0.0113 0.009 0.0075 0.0056 0.004 0.0038 0.0035 0.0031 0.0037 
W-L -0.0223 -0.0175 -0.0158 -0.0108 -0.0073 -0.006 -0.0047 -0.0031 -0.0009 
t-stat. -1.827* -2.0545** -2.4767** -2.3696** -1.8270* -1.6523*  -1.4062  -0.9766  -0.3606  
Std W 0.0468 0.2164 0.4652 0.682 0.8259 0.9088 0.9533 0.9764 0.9881 
Std L 0.0507 0.2251 0.4744 0.6888 0.8299 0.911 0.9545 0.977 0.9884 
F stat. 0.8545**  0.8099**  0.8317**  0.8629  0.8248**  0.7908**  0.7935**  0.8448**  0.9132  
Strategy 12-1 12-2 12-4 12-8 12-12 12-16 12-20 12-26 12-52 
Winner -0.0104 -0.0078 -0.0074 -0.0043 -0.0029 -0.0018 -0.0009 0.0002 0.003 
Loser 0.01 0.0078 0.007 0.0047 0.0041 0.0036 0.0032 0.003 0.0039 
W-L -0.0204 -0.0156 -0.0144 -0.009 -0.007 -0.0055 -0.0041 -0.0028 -0.0009 
t-stat. -1.6568*  -1.8135*  -2.2245**  -1.9341*  -1.7248* -1.4993  -1.2020  -0.8944  -0.3617  
Std W 0.0475 0.218 0.4669 0.6833 0.8266 0.9092 0.9535 0.9765 0.9882 
Std L 0.0506 0.2249 0.4742 0.6886 0.8298 0.911 0.9544 0.977 0.9884 
F stat. 0.8828  0.8198**  0.8200**  0.8253**  0.7730**  0.7651**  0.7631**  0.8256**  0.9074  
Strategy 16-1 16-2 16-4 16-8 16-12 16-16 16-20 16-26 16-52 
Winner -0.0082 -0.0064 -0.006 -0.0038 -0.0026 -0.0014 -0.0006 0.0007 0.0032 
Loser 0.0091 0.0066 0.0059 0.0048 0.0037 0.0032 0.003 0.0028 0.004 
W-L -0.0174 -0.013 -0.0119 -0.0086 -0.0063 -0.0045 -0.0036 -0.0021 -0.0008 
t-stat. -1.3981  -1.4901  -1.7953*  -1.8202*  -1.5357  -1.2279  -1.0524  -0.6566  -0.3289  
Std W 0.0477 0.0662 0.0991 0.1401 0.1783 0.2128 0.2469 0.3046 0.5519 
Std L 0.0506 0.0726 0.1096 0.1571 0.2051 0.2467 0.2847 0.3388 0.582 
F stat. 0.8881  0.8313**  0.8174**  0.7961**  0.7555**  0.7438**  0.7508**  0.8083**  0.9101  
Strategy 20-1 20-2 20-4 20-8 20-12 20-16 20-20 20-26 20-52 
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6 out of the 19 strategies are significant at 5% level. For 4-H strategies, 4-4 and 4-
8 are statistically significant at 5% level. For 8-H strategies, 8-2, 8-4 and 8-8 are 
statistically significant. For 12-H, only 12-4 is statistically significant. The results 
show that the most significant contrarian profits cluster around short and 
intermediate-term formation and holding periods. The result is consistent with 
Kang et al. (2002) that the 5% statistically significant contrarian profits are found 
in short to intermediate-term formation and holding periods. However, unlike 
Kang et al. (2002), which also report higher profits for longer holding periods 
from 1993 to 2000, our result shows no such pattern emerging. The magnitude of 
contrarian profits is from 0.6% to 2.2%, and average profit is 1.1%. Also, it is 
observed that for fixed formation period, contrarian profit decreases as the holding 
period becomes longer. We also conduct F-test for comparing the variances 
between winner portfolio and loser portfolio. It is interesting to notice that among 
Winner -0.0075 -0.0059 -0.0056 -0.0035 -0.0022 -0.0012 -0.0002 0.0012 0.0033 
Loser 0.0094 0.0077 0.0069 0.0047 0.0035 0.0032 0.003 0.0028 0.0043 
W-L -0.0169 -0.0137 -0.0125 -0.0082 -0.0057 -0.0043 -0.0032 -0.0016 -0.001 
t-stat. -1.3615  -1.5526  -1.8866*  -1.7386*  -1.3813  -1.1639  -0.9173  -0.5025  -0.3759  
Std W 0.0478 0.066 0.0989 0.1394 0.1777 0.2134 0.2482 0.3054 0.4827 
Std L 0.0507 0.073 0.1101 0.1576 0.2063 0.2481 0.2867 0.34 0.5043 
F stat. 0.8886  0.8171**  0.8066**  0.7820**  0.7425**  0.7396**  0.7492**  0.8068**  0.9160  
Strategy 26-1 26-2 26-4 26-8 26-12 26'-16 26-20 26-26 26-52 
Winner -0.0066 -0.0055 -0.0052 -0.0032 -0.0017 -0.0004 0.0007 0.002 0.0036 
Loser 0.0079 0.006 0.0049 0.0038 0.0032 0.0029 0.0028 0.0033 0.0049 
W-L -0.0145 -0.0115 -0.0101 -0.007 -0.005 -0.0034 -0.0021 -0.0012 -0.0013 
t-stat. -1.1640  -1.2973  -1.5166  -1.4554  -1.1858  -0.8913  -0.6063  -0.3793  -0.4993  
Std W 0.0475 0.0658 0.0985 0.1402 0.1805 0.2173 0.2528 0.3101 0.4885 
Std L 0.0505 0.0727 0.11 0.1584 0.2078 0.2512 0.2888 0.341 0.506 
F stat. 0.8845  0.8180**  0.8025**  0.7840**  0.7543**  0.7480**  0.7661**  0.8270**  0.9320  
Strategy 52-1 52-2 52-4 52-8 52-12 52-16 52-20 52-26 52-52 
Winner -0.0022 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0008 0.0014 0.002 0.0041 
Loser 0.0099 0.0078 0.0068 0.006 0.0058 0.0057 0.0059 0.0062 0.0075 
W-L -0.0121 -0.0095 -0.0085 -0.0065 -0.0056 -0.0049 -0.0045 -0.0042 -0.0034 
t-stat. -0.9236  -1.0198  -1.2122  -1.2852  -1.2670  -1.2208  -1.2225  -1.2072  -1.2734  
Std W 0.0477 0.0668 0.1013 0.145 0.1889 0.2284 0.2655 0.326 0.5079 
Std L 0.0524 0.0752 0.1129 0.1621 0.2103 0.2516 0.289 0.326 0.5056 
F stat. 0.8303**  0.7898**  0.8062**  0.8005**  0.8064**  0.8235**  0.8443**  0.9033  1.0092  
Note: all returns are normalized to one-month return for comparison purpose. 
T-test is conducted for two sample (W and L) means with hypothesis that two means are equal. 
F-test is conducted for two sample (W and L) variances with hypothesis that two variance are 
equal. 
	   	       **Significance at 5% level and lower 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	                *Significance at 10% level 
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the 19 strategies found to be profitable, 13 strategies are tested to have statistically 
significant different variance between winner and losers. This implies that the 
different risks between winner and loser may be the reason for the variation in 
returns.  
The overall sample is divided into two subsamples, and the profitability results for 
subsamples and overall sample are summarized in Appendix. The full sample 
figures are then followed by the first subsample and the second subsample with 
similar layout. In total 243 strategies are reported, with 81 for each subsample. 
The investigation of the sample period before the financial crisis (from January 
2002 to August 2007) reveals a distinct pattern from the full sample. Among the 
81 strategies, 10 (4-4, 4-8, 8-4, 8-8, 12-4, 16-52, 20-52, 26-26, 26-52 and 52-52) 
are statistically significant. 5 out of the 10 are contrarian and the other 5 are 
momentum. The contrarian strategies are distributed among three short- to 
intermediate-term formation periods (4-H, 8-H and 12-H) and two short-term 
holding periods (F-4 and F-8). The five momentum profits cluster around three 
intermediate- to long-term formation periods (20-H, 26-H and 52-H) and two 
intermediate- to long-term holding periods (F-26 and F-52). The result is similar 
to that from Kang et al. (2002) as mentioned above. However, Kang et al. (2002) 
also document higher average contrarian profits than momentum profits, while our 
figure does not reveal similar pattern. Of all the 10 strategies, only the profits of 
8-4 (contrarian) and 26-52(momentum) strategies are significant at 5% level. 
Subsample 2 studying the period during the global financial crisis (from August 
2007 to December 2011) has yielded eight statistically significant strategies and 
they are all contrarian strategies (4-4, 26-52, 52-8, 52-12, 52-16, 52-20, 52-26 and 
52-52). They are from three formation periods (4-H, 26-H and 52-H) and seven 
holding periods (F-4, F8, F-12, F-16, F-20, F-26 and F-52). Noticeably, six out of 
the eight contrarian profits come from formation period of 52 weeks. A big 
distinction from what Kang et al. (2002) has found out, most of the contrarian 
strategies from after the financial crisis are intermediate- to long-term strategies. 
six out of eight contrarian profits are statistically significant at 5% level (26-52, 
52-12, 52-16, 52-20, 52-26 and 52-52). It indicates that the longer the formation 
period, the more probable that it is going to yield significant contrarian profits. 
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The comparison of the full sample, subsample 1 and subsample 2 reveals that the 
profit strategies within subsample 1 and subsample 2 are very different and they 
are in turn quite distinct from those of the full sample. There is only one strategy 
(4-4) that generates consistently contrarian profit during all the three periods. 5 
contrarian strategies (4-4, 4-8, 8-4, 8-8 and 12-4) overlap between full sample and 
subsample 1 (before the financial crisis). No strategies are found to be overlapping 
between full sample and subsample 2 as well as between subsample 1 and 
subsample 2. The migration of contrarian profits from short- and intermediate-
term formation periods to long-term formation periods could possibly indicate that 
the Chinese investors are moving towards longer investment horizon and are 
increasingly looking for value stocks. The shift could also imply that there is an 
on-going regime shift such as stricter regulations in the China market after the 
financial crisis or that the underlying risk of the market has been changing. 
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5. Alternative sources of contrarian profits 
Recall the discussions in section 1, contrarian profits obtained in China stock 
market may due to several sources. Firstly, measurement error has been controlled 
by skipping one day between formation period and holding period. Second, time-
varying market risk can be used to argue that losers contain higher risk than 
winners so as to capture higher returns. Third, overreaction to firm specific 
information may contribute to the reversal effect. Lastly, size-related lead-lag 
structure in stock returns may be an alternative to overreaction hypothesis. In 
section 5.3 we will test both overreaction hypothesis and lead-lag effect by 
constructing autocorrelation matrix.  
5.1 Robustness to time-varying market risk 
Contrarian strategies generating abnormal profits by simply buying loser and 
selling winner is a violation of week-form EMH. An interpretation for the 
evidence was introduced by Chan (1988), who documented non-constant risk over 
time between loser stocks and winner stocks as an explanation for abnormal 
profit. When risk changes are adjusted for the returns, profitability on contrarian 
strategies become reasonably small. The basic idea he concluded for contrarian 
profits is that losers tend to be riskier than winner in holding period. We follow 
Kang et al. (2002) using a simplified model from Chan (1988) below to 
investigate the significance of time-varying market risk to contrarian profits.  
rpt ! rft =! +"(rmt ! rft )+#t                p ! (W,L)                                 (1) 
For winner portfolio: 
rWt ! rft =!W +"W (rmt ! rft )+#Wt                                                            (1a) 
For loser portfolio: 
rLt ! rft =!L +"L (rmt ! rft )+#Lt                                                               (1b) 
Equation (1b)-(1a): 
rLt ! rWt =! c +" c (rmt ! rft )+# ct                                                               (2) 
Master Thesis GRA19003                                                                        03.09.2012 
 21 
Where ptr is the portfolio holding period return at time t , Wtr and Ltr  are winner 
and loser portfolios return respectively. ftr is the risk-free rate at time t , mtr  is the 
market index5 return at time t , 
ftmt rr −  is the market risk premium at time t , α and 
β are the intercept and slope (market beta) coefficients. The superscripts “c” refers 
to contrarian strategies. If the betas are significantly different from zero for 
equation (2), namely winner portfolio and loser portfolio has different market risk, 
we conclude that market risk contributes to abnormal returns in these contrarian 
strategies. We use this model to examine the 19 profitable contrarian strategies in 
overall sample. Results are reported in Table 3.   
 
Table 3. Robustness check for time-varying market risk 
  α β R2 
Full Sample (19 strategies) 
Strategy (1-1) 
     Winner -0.0048 (-3.1797) *** 0.8414 (21.6035) *** 0.474 
Loser 0.0007 (0.4717) 0.9094 (23.4492) *** 0.5149 
Loser-Winner 0.0055 (5.8751) *** 0.068 (2.8121) *** 0.015 
Strategy (4-4) 
     Winner -0.0125 (-4.9813) *** 1.0018 (32.4139) *** 0.6724 
Loser 0.0029 (0.9911) 0.9908 (27.4801) *** 0.5959 
Loser-Winner 0.0155 (7.5866) *** -0.011 (-0.4416) 0.0004 
Strategy (4-8) 
     Winner -0.0194 (-5.5282***) 0.997 (34.1002***) 0.696 
Loser 0.0026 (0.6326) 0.9587 (28.4764***) 0.6148 
Loser-Winner 0.022 (8.5973***) -0.0382 (-1.7978*) 0.0063 
Strategy (4-12) 
     Winner -0.0225 (-5.1547***) 0.9776 (35.704***) 0.7167 
Loser -0.0001 (-0.0126) 0.9998 (31.9666***) 0.6697 
Loser-Winner 0.0224 (8.0935***) 0.0223 (1.2805) 0.0032 
Strategy (8-1) 
     Winner -0.0037 (-2.5126)** 0.8621 (22.9522)*** 0.5076 
Loser 0.0019 (1.1758) 0.9135 (22.0297)*** 0.4871 
Loser-Winner 0.0055 (5.1949)*** 0.0514 (1.8661)* 0.0068 
Strategy (8-2) 
     Winner -0.0062 (-3.502)*** 0.9112 (29.0071)*** 0.6226 
Loser 0.0026 (1.2089) 0.955 (25.172)*** 0.5541 
Loser-Winner 0.0087 (6.037)*** 0.0438 (1.6964)* 0.0056 
Strategy (8-4) 
     Winner -0.0122 (-5.1775)*** 1.0006 (34.6011)*** 0.7021 
Loser 0.0036 (1.1821) 0.9961 (26.4308)*** 0.579 
Loser-Winner 0.0159 (7.7829)*** -0.0045 (-0.1816) 0.0001 
Strategy (8-8) 
     Winner -0.0189 (-5.6033)*** 0.9791 (34.9068)*** 0.7074 
                                                
5 see section 2. 
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Loser 0.0027 (0.6466) 0.9808 (28.2555)*** 0.613 
Loser-Winner 0.0217 (8.4278)*** 0.0017 (0.0784) 0. 
Strategy (8-12) 
     Winner -0.0224 (-5.2306)*** 0.9587 (35.7633)*** 0.7189 
Loser -0.001 (-0.2009) 1.0199 (31.9921)*** 0.6718 
Loser-Winner 0.0214 (7.7475)*** 0.0612 (3.5423)*** 0.0245 
Strategy (8-16) 
     Winner -0.0259 (-5.2849)*** 0.9447 (37.7155)*** 0.7415 
Loser -0.0031 (-0.5304) 1.0395 (34.9225)*** 0.7109 
Loser-Winner 0.0228 (7.8301)*** 0.0948 (6.3667)*** 0.0755 
Strategy (12-1) 
     Winner -0.0089 (-4.4262)*** 0.0973 (7.6875)*** 0.1044 
Loser -0.0038 (-1.7635)* 0.0959 (7.0639)*** 0.0896 
Loser-Winner 0.0051 (4.5828)*** -0.0015 (-0.21) 0.0001 
Strategy (12-2) 
     Winner -0.011 (-4.2713)*** 0.1928 (11.8904)*** 0.2184 
Loser -0.0032 (-1.0975) 0.1926 (10.5041)*** 0.179 
Loser-Winner 0.0078 (5.0519)*** -0.0002 (-0.0202) 0. 
Strategy (12-4) 
     Winner -0.0159 (-4.5368)*** 0.3732 (17.0157)*** 0.3649 
Loser -0.0015 (-0.3644) 0.3778 (14.9552)*** 0.3074 
Loser-Winner 0.0144 (6.4998)*** 0.0046 (0.3282) 0.0002 
Strategy (12-8) 
     Winner -0.0191 (-4.6515)*** 0.6679 (25.9757)*** 0.5744 
Loser -0.0012 (-0.2547) 0.6855 (22.3685)*** 0.5002 
Loser-Winner 0.0179 (6.2554)*** 0.0175 (0.9805) 0.0019 
Strategy (12-12) 
    Winner -0.0217 (-5.0938)*** 0.9466 (35.586)*** 0.7186 
Loser -0.0016 (-0.3049) 1.0412 (31.9514)*** 0.673 
Loser-Winner 0.0201 (6.8099)*** 0.0946 (5.1299)*** 0.0504 
Strategy (16-4) 
     Winner -0.0161 (-4.2447)*** 0.2687 (13.7844)*** 0.2758 
Loser -0.0044 (-1.0179) 0.2767 (12.5529)*** 0.24 
Loser-Winner 0.0118 (4.9131)*** 0.008 (0.6534) 0.0009 
Strategy (16-8) 
     Winner -0.0204 (-4.5074)*** 0.5051 (21.8965)*** 0.492 
Loser -0.0036 (-0.695) 0.5462 (20.5087)*** 0.4594 
Loser-Winner 0.0167 (5.6406)*** 0.0411 (2.7145)*** 0.0147 
Strategy (20-4) 
     Winner -0.0179 (-4.6199)*** 0.2183 (12.9448)*** 0.2525 
Loser -0.0057 (-1.3018) 0.236 (12.4907)*** 0.2393 
Loser-Winner 0.0123 (4.9546)*** 0.0177 (1.6483)* 0.0054 
Strategy (20-8) 
     Winner -0.0217 (-4.5269)*** 0.3985 (19.1585)*** 0.4273 
Loser -0.0058 (-1.0579) 0.4398 (18.4404)*** 0.4087 
Loser-Winner 0.0159 (5.2143)*** 0.0413 (3.1266)*** 0.0195 
Note: t-statistics are in the parentheses.  
* Significance level at 10%; 
**Significance level at 5%; 
***Significance level at 1%. 
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Tests results show that 14 out of the 19 strategies have positive betas. The rest 
with negative betas are strategies 4-4, 4-8, 8-4, 12-1, 12-2. But only 10 out of the 
19 betas are significantly different from zero, they are strategies: 1-1, 4-8, 8-1, 8-
2, 8-12, 8-16, 12-12, 16-8, 20-4, 20-8. The betas vary from 0.0177 to 0.0948. The 
majority strategies are profitable under the higher risk on loser stocks. Also, betas 
become larger when either formation or holding period gets longer. For example, 
strategy 8-16 and 12-12 have highest betas close to 0.095. It implies that 
intermediate contrarian strategies profits are easily influenced by time-varying 
market risk. However, betas are not the only explanation for contrarian profits. All 
the alphas are statistically significantly different from zero and are positive, 
indicating that there are more factors to explain contrarian profits. 
5.2. Overreaction to firm-specific information and lead-lag structure effect in 
stock returns 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) illustrate that overreaction effect is the cause of 
negative serial autocorrelation of individual securities. They highlight that 
extreme movement in stock prices will lead to opposite directional movements 
later on. Besides that, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) report that positive cross-serial 
autocorrelations are found between the returns of small stocks and the lagged 
returns of large stocks, denoting that size-related lead-lag structure in stock 
returns also contributes to the contrarian profits. Overreaction (serial 
autocorrelation) and lead-lag structure (cross-sectional autocorrelations) are 
widely considered as two of the most important sources of contrarian profits. In 
order to examine whether overreaction hypothesis and lead-lag structure are the 
main contributions to our contrarian profits, we follow the method adopted by 
Kang et al. (2002)  to sort our full sample into five quintile size-level portfolios 
based on their market capitalization at time t. The size-sorted portfolios are S1 
(smallest firms), S2, S3, S4 and S5 (largest firms) in an ascending order of firm 
size measured, and time t is the initial of every strategy formation time. As we are 
using overlapping return data, size-sorting process is conducted from time to time. 
For the 19 strategies tested to be profitable, we wonder whether it is the 
overreaction effect or the size related lead-lag structure that contributes to the 
abnormal return. We construct own-serial autocorrelations and cross-serial 
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autocorrelations for stock returns on holding period of five size-sorted quintile 
portfolios and report them in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Own-serial and cross-serial correlations of size-sorted portfolio returns for 
contrarian strategies  
  1-1 4-4 4-8 4-12 8-1 
  S1-Lagged S1 0.0671 0.1084** 0.1985** 0.213** 0.0498 
  S1-Lagged S5 0.082 0.1227** 0.3033** 0.3649** 0.0737 
  S5-lagged S1 -0.0552 0.0525 0.1873** 0.2325** -0.0659 
  S5-Lagged S5 0.0088 0.066 0.3012** 0.3808** 0.0059 
    8-2 8-4 8-8 8-12 8-16 
  S1-Lagged S1 0.1539** 0.0989** 0.2043** 0.2106** 0.2109** 
  S1-Lagged S5 0.1858** 0.1133** 0.3071** 0.3644** 0.3464** 
  S5-lagged S1 0.0705 0.0464 0.1887** 0.2275** 0.2485** 
  S5-Lagged S5 0.1665** 0.065 0.3069** 0.3798** 0.374** 
    12-1 12-2 12-4 12-8 12-12 
  S1-Lagged S1 0.0466 0.1523** 0.101** 0.2043** 0.2111** 
  S1-Lagged S5 0.0689 0.1901** 0.115** 0.3081** 0.3687** 
  S5-lagged S1 -0.0648 0.0796 0.0432 0.1854** 0.2252** 
  S5-Lagged S5 0.0071 0.175** 0.0658 0.3065** 0.3813** 
    16-4 16-8 20-4 20-8   
  S1-Lagged S1 0.0984** 0.2056** 0.1028** 0.2042** 
   S1-Lagged S5 0.1098** 0.3107** 0.1168** 0.3138** 
   S5-lagged S1 0.0412 0.1887** 0.0514 0.1884** 
   S5-Lagged S5 0.0666 0.3123** 0.0784 0.3155**   
  Table 4 reports autocorrelations and cross-serial correlations for holding period returns of 
size-sorted portfolios based on the 19 contrarian strategies that we found significant in 
overall sample period. For example, for 4-8 strategy stocks are formed into five size-sorted 
portfolios at the initial of four-week formation period, then eight-week holding period 
return is collected for correlations test. For each contrarian strategies, we present only four 
essential correlations. S1-lagged S1 and S5-lagged S5 provide the one holding period lag 
(e.g. 4-8 strategy with holding period of 8 weeks takes 8-week lag) own- serial 
correlations between holding period returns of smallest stocks (S1) and largest stock (S5). 
S1-lagged S5 provides the cross-serial correlations between holding period returns of 
smallest stocks (S1) and lagged returns of largest stocks (S5).  S5-lagged S1 provides the 
correlation between holding period returns of largest stocks (S5) and lagged returns of 
smallest stocks (S1). Since the observations vary from 482 (strategy 8-16) to 520 (strategy 
1-1) due to weekly overlapping, we assume the data is under normal distribution and use 
Pearson correlation coefficient. T-tests under 5% significance level are conducted and 
results represented by **.  
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Among the 19 strategies, all the 38 own-serial autocorrelations are positive, and of 
which 28 correlations are significant under 5% significance level. It shows that 
within the same size group, the dominance of positive own-serial autocorrelations 
indicates an underreaction effect to firm-specific information, but not overreaction 
as documented by Kang et al. (2002). Though this result is inconsistent with 
previous findings, we explain the reasons to be the following: Kang et al. (2002) 
sorted the five size quintile portfolios at the initial of formation time, namely that 
stocks within the same size group would not be altered as time passes. The 
negative own-serial autocorrelation is examined existing in individual security 
level. However, we simulate the real trading world and sort the market 
capitalization of stocks before each time we form the portfolio. In fact, each size 
quintile’s return is more closed to the market index return and shows large 
positive serial autocorrelation 6 .Therefore, we suggest that if portfolios are 
constructed from time to time with different component stocks, overreaction effect 
is not a contribution to contrarian strategies.  
Among the 38 cross-serial autocorrelations, only three of them are negative and 
insignificantly different from zero. This suggests that positive cross-serial 
autocorrelations dominate our sample, indicating that leading stocks with high 
return will follow by lagged stocks in the same direction, making contrarian 
strategies profitable when leading stocks are shorted and lagged stocks are longed. 
We notice that only 1-1, 8-1, and 12-1 strategies have not significant small-lead-
large autocorrelations. For the remaining strategies varying from short-term 
period to intermediate period, small-lead-large has a materially higher 
autocorrelation magnitude (averagely 0.2189) than large-lead-small (averagely 
0.1094). This suggests that smallest stocks are still leading large stocks in China 
stock market. The existence of positive cross-serial autocorrelation in stock 
portfolios gives rise to the conclusion that size-related lead-lag structure 
contributes to contrarian strategies, and the unique characteristics that small stocks 
lead large stocks still exist and is consistent with the findings from Kang et al. 
(2002). A reason for such leading direction may be boiled down to the fact that 
manipulating the sentiment in small stocks is much easier by the syndicate 
speculators as discussed in previous section. The dominance of individual 
                                                
6 Market index return is firstly found to be positively autocorrelated in the US market, according to 
Lo and Mackinlay (1988)  
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investors in the stock market is also a force, that less rational and educated 
investors become followers who facilitate the sentiment. 
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6. Decomposition of the contrarian profits 
A framework for decomposing the expected contrarian profits was first adopted in 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990). The Lo and MacKinlay (1990) framework, and the 
other decomposition models based on this framework, such as Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1995) and Conrad and Kaul (1998), all assume symmetric lengths of 
formation (ranking) and holding periods. However, the lengths of the formation 
and holding periods could have be crucial for the contrarian strategies, given that 
winners and losers are ranked and selected in the formation periods and the 
returns are generated in the holding periods. To investigate the full spectrum of 
sources of the contrarian profits across various formation and holding periods, 
Chou et al. (2007) extend the framework by Lo and MacKinlay (1990) to 
asymmetric lengths of formation and holding periods and apply it on examination 
of the Japanese stock market. In this section we are going to apply the extended 
decomposition model from Chou et al. (2007) into the 19 contrarian strategies we 
document in the full sample. 
The model is explained firstly with the introduction of some notions. Let 
),( kttRi +  be the holding period return of stock i ( i =1,2,3,...,N ) from time t to 
time kt + ( k =1,2,3,.... ), and ),1( ttRR iit −=  be the one-period7 return generated 
from 1−t to t . Also we denote ),( kttR + to be a 1×N  column vector for a 
collection of returns of N individual stocks and ),1( ttRRt −= to be the column 
vector of one-period returns from time 1−t to time t . The mean of tR is referred to 
as µ, and its k-th order autocovariance matrix as ( )( )[ ]'µµ −−=Γ − tktk RRE , .0≥k  
Therefore, an “market portfolio” formed by all stocks with equal weights will be 
shown exactly as below:   
( )
N
ttR
N
ttRR i
N
i
mtm
1,11),1(
1
, =−=−= ∑
=
1’ ),1( ttR −                                   (3) 
where 1 is a column vector of ones. The expected one-period return of the market 
portfolio is therefore 
Nm
1
=µ  1’ µ and its kth order autocovariance is 2
1
N
1’ kΓ 1. 
                                                
7 According to Chou et al. (2007), “one-period” could be 1 week or 2 weeks or any time periods, 
depending on the purpose of the research. But in our research, it represents one week. 
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The above notions are used to extend Lo and MacKinlay (1990) framework to 
allow for asymmetric lengths of formation and holding periods. The p-period 
return of the equally weighted market portfolio is written as follows: 
 
∑
=
=−=−
tN
i t
i
t
m N
tptR
N
tptR
1
1),(1),( 1’ ),( tptR −                                            (4) 
Eq. (4) differs from the Eq. (3) in that Eq. (3) is essentially a rebalanced equally 
weighted portfolio while Eq. (4) represents a buy-and-hold portfolio that assigns 
an equal weight to each component stock in the initial investment at time t-p and 
holds for p periods. 
Let )(pwit  be the weight invest on stock i, is denoted as below: 
[ ]),(),(1)( tptRtptR
N
pw mit
t
it −−−−=                                                            (5) 
Negative sign in the front means the stock is shorted. Under the contrarian 
strategy, a winner is determined and shorted when its previous return is lower than 
the previous market return. A loser is longed for opposite reason. The collection 
of the individual stock weights constructs a column vector
wt (p) = (wit (p),...,wNt (p) !) , and )(pwt could be rewritten as Eq. (6): 
2
1),(1)(
tt
t N
tptR
N
pw +−−=  1’ ),( tptR − 1                                                   (6) 
The contrarian profit from a (p, q) strategy8 can be shown in the following: 
   ),()(),( qttRpwqp tt +ʹ′=π  
2
1),(),(1
tt N
pTtRtptR
N
++ʹ′−−= 1’ ),(),( pTtRtptR +ʹ′− 1             (7) 
If ),( qttRt + , the q-period holding return is approximated by the simple sum of 
∑ = +
q
l t
R
1 1
 (1 here represents a week). Then, Eq. (8) becomes: 
                                                
8 “p” represents formation period, and “q” represents holding period. 
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Thus, the expected profit of a contrarian portfolio can be approximately 
decomposed to three components: 
),(),(),()),(( 2 qpqpOqpCqpE tttt σπ −−=                                                       (9) 
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The three components are similar to Lo and MacKinlay (1990). The first term, 
),( qpCt , captures the cross-autocorrelations (also referred to as the “lead-lag 
effect”) among individual stocks. A positive number of the term means that 
individual stocks have a tendency to follow the movement of the other stocks and 
will therefore contribute to the expected contrarian profit, and vice-versa. The 
second term, ),( qpOt , refers to the average of the autocorrelations of all the 
individual stocks at time t. A negative ),( qpOt means that on average the 
individual stocks overreact to the information at time t and under-react if ),( qpOt
is positive. Hence, a positive autocorrelation term would hurt the expected 
contrarian profit and hence it is put on a negative sign in Eq. (9). The last term 
),(2 qptσ is the cross-sectional variation in expected returns of individual stocks at 
time t and hence it is always positive. The contribution of the term to expected 
contrarian profit is therefore always negative. 
As indicated in Eq. (9c), a contrarian strategy depends on the lengths of the 
formation and holding period. If the return-generating process is independently 
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time, the first term and the second term in 
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Eq. (9) will no longer exist. The expected profit of the contrarian portfolio then 
becomes ),()),(( qpOqpE tt −=π , and the per period holding return is: 
)(),(( 22 ∑∑∑ −−=
i
i
i j
ji
t N
N
p
q
qpE
µµµ
π                      (10) 
which depends only on the cross-sectional variation in individual returns along 
with lengths of the formation and holding horizons. This suggests that 1) the 
momentum strategy will be more profitable the longer the formation period and 2) 
if the returns of the stocks are i.i.d., there will only be momentum profit since the 
corss-sectional variation term will always be negative in Eq.(9). 
Eq. (9) also implies that for a contrarian strategy to be profitable, the stock returns 
must exhibit time-series predictability. Only if the positive cross-autocorrelations 
and/or negative autocorrelations persistently dominate/dominates the cross-
sectional variation will the contrarian strategy be profitable.  
Table 5 presents the percentage of each of the three components ( ),( qpCt , 
q)(p,O- t  and ),(
2 qptσ−  for the 19 full sample contrarian strategies. Columns A, 
B and C host the cross-autocorrelation, the autocorrelation and the cross-sectional 
variation term, respectively. Column D reports the sum from the cross-
autocorrelation (Column A) and autocorrelation (Column B). It represents the 
proportion of the expected contrarian profit that is due to time-series predictability 
(i.e., ),(),( qpOqpC tt − ). 
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Table 5. Decomposition of the expected contrarian profits for the 19 contrarian 
strategies   
Column A B C D 
  Cross-Auto- correlation 
Auto- 
correlation 
Cross-
sectional  
variation 
Time-Series  
predictability 
Strategies C(p,q) -O(p,q) -σ(p,q) C(p,q)--O(p,q) 
1-1 89.65% 10.53% -0.18% 100.18% 
4-4 73.72% 30.35% -4.08% 104.08% 
4-8 269.79% -163.51% -6.28% 106.28% 
4-12 493.52% -375.39% -18.13% 118.13% 
8-1 182.30% -77.90% -4.40% 104.40% 
8-2 -113.52% 212.88% 0.64% 99.36% 
8-4 228.44% -122.79% -5.65% 105.65% 
8-8 300.92% -193.43% -7.49% 107.49% 
8-12 323.02% -213.63% -9.39% 109.39% 
8-16 122.44% -21.64% -0.80% 100.80% 
12-1 252.11% -146.40% -5.71% 105.71% 
12-2 -137.51% 236.52% 0.99% 99.01% 
12-4 235.09% -127.85% -7.24% 107.24% 
12-8 327.78% -218.25% -9.54% 109.54% 
12-12 387.42% -249.93% -37.49% 137.49% 
16-4 286.64% -177.85% -8.79% 108.79% 
16-8 404.71% -295.92% -8.79% 108.79% 
20-4 476.51% -359.65% -16.86% 116.86% 
20-8 483.30% -361.17% -22.13% 122.13% 
Average 246.65% -137.63% -9.02% 109.02% 
Max 493.52% 236.52% 0.99% 137.49% 
Min -137.51% -375.39% -37.49% 99.01% 
This table presents the decomposition of expected contrarian profits of the 19 contrarian 
strategies significant at 10% level. Column A reports the proportion attributable to cross-
sectional autocorrelation (lead-lag relations). Column B shows the percentage accounted for 
by autocorrelations (overreaction/underreaction). Column C is the proportion in cross-
sectional variation. Column D presents the proportion of the sum of cross-sectional 
autocorrelation and autocorrelation in total expected profits. It is also known as the 
component explainable by time-series predictability. Note the sum of the first three columns 
(A, B and C) is strictly 100%. 
 
In order for contrarian strategy to be profitable, the sum of the cross-
autocorrelation and autocorrelation term ),(),( qpOqpC tt −  should be greater than 
the cross-sectional variation term. Among the 19 strategies we examine, 17 
demonstrate stronger time-series predictability than cross-sectional variation (i.e. 
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they are expected to have contrarian profits). 2 strategies (8-2 and 12-2) are 
expected to have momentum profits. The average percentage of the sum of cross-
autocorrelation and autocorrelation is 109.02%, and the cross-sectional variation 
therefore only accounts for -9.02% of the contrarian profits (or hurts 9.02% of the 
contrarian profit on average). The result confirms that contrarian strategies are the 
dominant strategies for the full data sample from 2002 to 2011 with the profit 
explainable by strong time-series predictability. 
The fact that most of the contribution from the autocorrelation term ( ),( qpOt− ) 
is negative is consistent with our previous finding that overreaction is not a source 
of contrarian profit. In general, under-reaction to firm specific information is 
profound and it is the biggest source to drag down contrarian profit. On the other 
hand, a dominant positive cross-autocorrelation suggests that lead-lag effect is the 
sole provider of expected contrarian profit. Also by comparing Column C and D, 
we found that the increase in the lengths of either formation or holding period 
leverages the effect of time-series predictability. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this thesis we investigate the momentum/contrarian strategies in the China “A” 
share market from 2002 to 2011. 81 strategies from a combination of 9 different 
formation periods and 9 different holding periods (F, H=1, 2, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 26, 
52) are examined. Our empirical results show that contrarian strategies are 
profitable on all the 81 strategies, and the most significant contrarian profits 
cluster around short-term and the intermediate-term, from 1 week to 20 weeks. 
Contrarian profits are up to 2.2% per month and decrease as holding period gets 
longer. We investigate into the two subsamples and it shows that momentum 
strategies are gradually losing ground to contrarian strategies over time, and 
contrarian profits are moving towards long-term-formation-period strategies after 
the financial crisis.  
We conduct robustness tests to see if the three well-documented sources of 
contrarian profit: the time-varying market risk, overreaction effect and lead-lag 
structure can explain the contrarian profit we exploit earlier. The result from 
running the CAPM-like models indicates that time-varying market risk is one of 
the source contributes to contrarian strategy, but not a major one. Furthermore, the 
manipulation of the size-sorted portfolios suggest that overreaction is not a source 
of the contrarian profit and small stocks still lead large stocks in returns as 
consistent with the findings from Kang et al. (2002).  
Lastly, the decomposition of the contrarian profits demonstrates that lead-lag 
effect is the sole provider of expected contrarian profit as compared to the US 
market whose contrarian profits are mostly attributed to overreaction. Our results 
indicate that 1) the Chinese “A” share market is similar to the Japanese market but 
distinct from the US market in terms of contrarian/momentum patterns; and 2) the 
market is more rational and the participants are more long-term oriented compared 
with 10 years ago. 
The similarity in terms of abnormal profit between the Chinese market we 
examine and the Japanese market under the investigation of Chou et al. (2007) 
could stem from fact that the two markets have some fundamental similarities. 
While the widely practice of cross-holding in the Japanese market curb liquidity, 
the privatization of the Chinese state enterprises also leave a large amount of stock 
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holdings untraded (as they are being hold in the hands of the state council that 
does not trade frequently). The Chinese and the Japanese are also considered as 
more collectivist than are Americans.  Overconfidence and self-attribution bias are 
shown to be the major reason for momentum strategies to be profitable by Daniel 
et al. (1998). There are other reasons for the China “A” share market to exhibit the 
pattern we have reported. Such analysis is left for future work for researchers. 
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Appendix 
Profitability of momentum and contrarian strategies based on equal weighted portfolios 
for full sample, subsample 1and subsample 2 
1-H 1-1 1-2 1-4 1-8 1-12 1-16 1-20 1-26 1-52 
Full Sample 
W-L -0.0220  -0.0058  -0.0067  -0.0057  -0.0042  -0.0033  -0.0030  -0.0022  -0.0006  
t-stat. -1.8510*  -0.6864  -1.0517  -1.2442  -1.0488  -0.9305  -0.9094  -0.7147  -0.2612  
Subsample 1: Before the financial crisis 
W-L -0.0151  -0.0014  -0.0067  -0.0050  -0.0031  -0.0031  -0.0030  -0.0019  0.0002  
t-stat. -1.0735  -0.1377  -0.6410  -0.9015  -0.6245  -0.6915  -0.7154  -0.4864  0.0840  
Subsample 2: After the financial crisis 
W-L -0.0299  -0.0112  -0.0067  -0.0063  -0.0050  -0.0031  -0.0026  -0.0024  -0.0016  
t-stat. 1.4759  0.7791  0.8107  0.8364  0.7586  0.5148  0.4723  0.4594  0.3904  
2-H 2-1 2-2 2-4 2-8 2-12 2-16 2-20 2-26 2-52 
Full Sample 
W-L -0.0114  -0.0033  -0.0067  -0.0073  -0.0051  -0.0035  -0.0034  -0.0022  -0.0005  
t-stat. -0.9554  -0.3888  -1.1953  -1.6003  -1.2853  -0.9717  -1.0128  -0.7065  -0.2174  
Subsample 1: Before the financial crisis 
W-L -0.0053  0.0004  -0.0067  -0.0070  -0.0045  -0.0030  -0.0033  -0.0013  0.0010  
t-stat. -0.3826  0.0446  -0.7818  -1.2519  -0.9253  -0.6612  -0.7755  -0.3324  0.3629  
Subsample 2: After the financial crisis 
W-L -0.0182  -0.0080  -0.0067  -0.0079  -0.0052  -0.0036  -0.0031  -0.0031  -0.0022  
t-stat. 0.8855  0.5550  0.9026  1.0384  0.7780  0.5876  0.5454  0.5675  0.5263  
4-H 4-1 4-2 4-4 4-8 4-12 4-16 4-20 4-26 4-52 
Full Sample 
W-L -0.0175  -0.0126  -0.0067  -0.0110  -0.0076  -0.0055  -0.0050  -0.0032  -0.0009  
t-stat. -1.4528  -1.4973  -2.4252**  -2.4008**  -1.9045*  -1.5415  -1.4973  -1.0103  -0.3775  
Subsample 1: Before the financial crisis 
W-L -0.0123  -0.0091  -0.0067  -0.0107  -0.0065  -0.0050  -0.0047  -0.0015  0.0015  
t-stat. -0.8791  -0.9080  -1.8083*  -1.9296*  -1.3330  -1.1069  -1.1076  -0.3875  0.5335  
Subsample 2: After the financial crisis 
W-L -0.0238  -0.0175  -0.0067  -0.0115  -0.0080  -0.0056  -0.0047  -0.0045  -0.0032  
t-stat. 1.1411  1.2117  1.6857*  1.5096  1.1887  0.9026  0.8143  0.8277  0.7712  
8-H 8-1 8-2 8-4 8-8 8-12 8-16 8-20 8-26 8-52 
Full Sample 
W-L -0.0221  -0.0174  -0.0067  -0.0109  -0.0073  -0.0060  -0.0048  -0.0031  -0.0009  
t-stat. -1.8270*  -2.0545**  -2.4767**  -2.3696**  -1.8270*  -1.6523*  -1.4062  -0.9766  -0.3606  
Subsample 1: Before the financial crisis 
W-L -0.0186  -0.0153  -0.0067  -0.0104  -0.0066  -0.0055  -0.0035  -0.0002  0.0028  
t-stat. -1.3251  -1.5192  -2.0066**  -1.8551*  -1.3156  -1.1962  -0.8005  -0.0484  0.9889  
Subsample 2: After the financial crisis 
W-L -0.0275  -0.0211  -0.0067  -0.0108  -0.0071  -0.0053  -0.0048  -0.0050  -0.0038  
t-stat. 1.2951  1.4298  1.5442  1.4024  1.0354  0.8325  0.8209  0.9089  0.9431  
12-H 12-1 12-2 12-4 12-8 12-12 12-16 12-20 12-26 12-52 
Full Sample 
W-L -0.020  -0.016  -0.007  -0.009  -0.007  -0.005  -0.004  -0.003  -0.001  
t-stat. -1.657*  -1.813* -2.224**  -1.934*  -1.725*  -1.499  -1.202  -0.894  -0.362  
Subsample 1: Before the financial crisis 
W-L -0.017  -0.014  -0.007  -0.008  -0.006  -0.003  -0.001  0.001  0.004  
t-stat. -1.190  -1.317  -1.722*  -1.412  -1.147  -0.753  -0.233  0.365  1.354  
Subsample 2: After the financial crisis 
W-L -0.022  -0.018  -0.007  -0.008  -0.006  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  -0.004  
t-stat. 1.101  1.172  1.291  1.074  0.872  0.833  0.852  0.973  1.120  
16-H 16-1 16-2 16-4 16-8 16-12 16-16 16-20 16-26 16-52 
Full Sample 
W-L -0.0172  -0.0130  -0.0067  -0.0086  -0.0063  -0.0046  -0.0036  -0.0021  -0.0008  
t-stat. -1.3981  -1.4901  -1.7953*  -1.8202*  -1.5357  -1.2279  -1.0524  -0.6566  -0.3289  
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Subsample 1: Before the financial crisis 
W-L -0.0138  -0.0106  -0.0067  -0.0078  -0.0041  -0.0012  0.0007  0.0033  0.0048  
t-stat. -0.9479  -1.0113  -1.3436  -1.3270  -0.7891  -0.2460  0.1640  0.8404  1.6549*  
Subsample 2: After the financial crisis 
W-L -0.0193  -0.0143  -0.0067  -0.0075  -0.0060  -0.0053  -0.0055  -0.0055  -0.0046  
t-stat. 0.8801  0.9319  1.0103  0.9400  0.8387  0.8094  0.9005  0.9519  1.2423  
20-H 20-1 20-2 20-4 20-8 20-12 20-16 20-20 20-26 20-52 
Full Sample 
W-L -0.0168  -0.0136  -0.0067  -0.0083  -0.0057  -0.0043  -0.0032  -0.0016  -0.0010  
t-stat. -1.3615  -1.5526  -1.8866*  -1.7386*  -1.3813  -1.1639  -0.9173  -0.5025  -0.3759  
Subsample 1: Before the financial crisis 
W-L -0.0140  -0.0121  -0.0067  -0.0063  -0.0019  0.0005  0.0023  0.0051  0.0056  
t-stat. -0.9547  -1.1415  -1.4995  -1.0596  -0.3757  0.1016  0.5223  1.2765  1.9270*  
Subsample 2: After the financial crisis 
W-L -0.0191  -0.0142  -0.0067  -0.0085  -0.0070  -0.0067  -0.0065  -0.0069  -0.0056  
t-stat. 0.8696  0.9276  1.0326  1.0505  0.9585  1.0029  1.0433  1.1640  1.5577  
26-H 26-1 26-2 26-4 26-8 26-12 26'-16 26-20 26-26 26-52 
Full Sample 
W-L -0.0144  -0.0114  -0.0067  -0.0070  -0.0050  -0.0034  -0.0021  -0.0012  -0.0013  
t-stat. -1.1640  -1.2973  -1.5166  -1.4554  -1.1858  -0.8913  -0.6063  -0.3793  -0.4993  
Subsample 1: Before the financial crisis 
W-L -0.0091  -0.0064  -0.0067  -0.0015  0.0016  0.0039  0.0058  0.0073  0.0065  
t-stat. -0.6168  -0.5924  -0.6881  -0.2532  0.3039  0.7981  1.2651  1.8079*  2.1680**  
Subsample 2: After the financial crisis 
W-L -0.0185  -0.0154  -0.0067  -0.0111  -0.0096  -0.0090  -0.0090  -0.0094  -0.0072  
t-stat. 0.8301  0.9986  1.1841  1.3465  1.3190  1.3111  1.4188  1.5932  2.2284**  
52-H 52-1 52-2 52-4 52-8 52-12 52-16 52-20 52-26 52-52 
Full Sample 
W-L -0.0120  -0.0095  -0.0067  -0.0065  -0.0056  -0.0049  -0.0046  -0.0042  -0.0035  
t-stat. -0.9236  -1.0198  -1.2122  -1.2852  -1.2670  -1.2208  -1.2225  -1.2072  -1.2734  
Subsample 1: Before the financial crisis 
W-L 0.0010  0.0033  -0.0067  0.0049  0.0060  0.0064  0.0066  0.0071  0.0061  
t-stat. 0.0622  0.2754  0.3790  0.7441  1.0282  1.1949  1.3165  1.5838  1.8347*  
Subsample 2: After the financial crisis 
W-L -0.0216  -0.0193  -0.0067  -0.0148  -0.0137  -0.0124  -0.0119  -0.0118  -0.0074  
t-stat. 1.0045  1.2774  1.5434  1.9564**  2.1246**  2.3137**  2.4408**  2.7317**  2.3622**  
Note: all returns are normalized to one-month return for comparison purpose. 
T-test is conducted for two sample (W and L) means with hypothesis that two means are equal. 
 
     **Significance at 5% level and lower 
              *Significance at 10% level 
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1. Introduction to Research Topic 
    The main objectives of the thesis can be summarized as below:   
    Firstly, we want to examine the profitability of various contrarian and 
momentum strategies in China stock market from 2002 to 2011. By doing so, we 
can see to what extent China stock market has changed and developed. Especially, 
this sample period includes the latest financial crises from 2007 to now. The 
investigation is expected to shed lights on investment strategies through market 
down turns.  
    Secondly, we aim to investigate alternative sources of the abnormal profits 
specific to China stock market. The assumed sources for examination are time-
varying market risk, overreaction to firm-specific information, and lead-lag 
structure effect as documented by Kang et al. (2002). Besides, we want to 
investigate disposition effect in explaining these momentum profits.  
    Thirdly, if it is applicable, we would like to repeat the Jegadeesh and Titman  
(1995) one-factor model and decompose the relative importance of alternative 
sources. By comparing the results with Kang et al. (2002), we might generate a 
new view on the China stock market. We hope to internalize latest finding 
regarding the topic and provide evidence for both investors and financial 
researchers.  
    In accordance of the efficient market hypothesis, as refined by Eugene Fama 
(1970), security prices, at any time, fully reflect all available information in an 
efficient market. Price changes only to reflect new information. As new 
information is unpredictable, price changes should be unpredictable. Thus, price is 
following a random walk and no investment pattern can be discovered for the 
purpose to capture excess return. It results that no investors can outprofit the 
others by predicting the stock returns. Among the three versions of EMH, the 
weak-form hypothesis suggests that all historical prices and returns have been 
reflected on current prices. Thus no technical analysis can predict or help to form 
strategies to beat the market. However, empirical tests using serial correlation on 
stock returns find out stock market returns have a tendency to be related to past 
stock returns，which contradicts to the weak-form EMH.  Considerable quantities 
of financial literatures, since 1980s, have shown that historical stock returns have 
predictability for future stock returns in different time horizons, challenging the 
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weak-form EMH in the tested markets. For instance, Lo and Mackinlay (1988) 
report weak positive serial correlation on short horizon (1-6 months) by 
examining the US market index, that positive past return leads to positive current 
return. And for individual securities, reversal effect seems more common as 
indicated by Lehmann (1990) and Jagedeesh (1990), that US stock with positive 
past return tend to reverse and perform poorly later on. Moreover, portfolio of US 
stocks experiences continuation (momentum) effects on intermediate horizon (3-
12 months) as documented by Jagedeesh and Titman (1993) that past winner 
(loser) portfolios perform continuously over time. On the other hand, Debondt and 
Thaler (1985, 1987) find out that in US market reversal (contrarian) effect 
happens on long horizon (3-5 years) that recent loser portfolios currently 
outperform recent winners.  
    With the suggestion of momentum effect and reversal effect along the time 
horizon on cross-sectional stock returns, abnormal profits can be obtained by 
forming the portfolio-investment strategies: momentum strategies and contrarian 
strategies. Momentum (strengthen) strategy is to buy the past portfolios that 
performed well and sell the past portfolios that performed poorly (buy past winner 
and sell past loser), because prior winner is likely to become current winner. 
While contrarian strategy is to do the opposite in the belief of prior winner will 
become current loser.  
    Momentum and contrarian strategies have been first tested and documented 
profitable to some extent in the US market as shown above. Recently, Parhizgari 
and Nguyen (2008) come up with considerable support for the presence of the 
momentum and contrarian strategies in the American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) 
market. Besides, the momentum or contrarian effects are found in non-US 
markets as well. Ahmet and Nusret (1999) discover long-term contrarian effects in 
the stock markets of seven non-US industrialized countries. Rouwenhorst (1998) 
reports momentum profits in 12 European equity markets. Schiereck et al. (1999) 
find momentum profits in the intermediate-term, and short- and long-term 
contrarian profits in the Germany equity market. Chang et al. (1995) reports short-
term contrarian effects in the Japan stock market. Not only in developed countries, 
but also the emerging markets experience the momentum or contrarian effects to 
different degree. Rouwenhorst (1999) discovers momentum profits in six out of 
twenty emerging equity markets. Hameed and Ting (2000) also document short-
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term contrarian strategies results in abnormal profits in the Malaysia stock market. 
Locke and Gupta (2009) report contrarian strategies profitable in the Indian 
market.  
    Specifically for China market (including Hong Kong), a few valuable 
literatures regarding the discovery of momentum or contrarian effects have 
captured researcher’s interest. Existing findings are, for example, that Ding et al. 
(2008) document momentum and contrarian profits in seven Pacific-Basin 
markets including China. They also report that this effect especially pronounced 
in Hong Kong. Hameed and Yuanto (2000) find small momentum profits in six 
Asian stock markets and China is one of them. Kang et al. (2002) document 
significant profits on short-term contrarian effect and intermediate-term 
momentum effect in China for the period 1993 to 2000. By investigating only 
Shanghai stock exchange, Naughton (2008) suggests substantial profitability on 
momentum strategies during 1995 to 2005.  On the other hand, Li et al (2010) 
suggest no momentum profitability for the period 1994 to 2007 while support that 
the short-term contrarian strategies can capture, on average, 12% abnormal return 
annually. Du and Nie (2007) find evidence supporting no intermediate-term 
momentum effect, but profitable long-term (18-36 months) contrarian effect.  
    Why momentum strategies or contrarian strategies can beat the market as the 
empirical studies shown? Former researchers try to figure out explanations to 
momentum and contrarian profits, which basically related to behavioral 
irrationality and stock market inefficiency.  
    Among the alternative sources for the abnormal return brought along by 
contrarian strategies, investor’s overreaction to information is the most notable 
one. As DeBondt and Thaler (1985) illustrate, overreaction hypothesis suggests 
that extreme price movement leads to an opposite-direction price movement later, 
which matches the magnitude of the initial price movement. The overreaction 
hypothesis is tested predictive as on long-term contrarian profitability in the US 
market. It is iterated that investors tend to overact with bad, firm-specific news. 
The pessimistic attitude drags down the price. As what goes down must come up, 
the negative serial dependence of individual security raises possibility for past 
loser to outperform the past winner. And contrarian strategy exploits this 
phenomenon. The hypothesis is supported by Lehmann (1988), Delong et al. 
(1989) and so on. Later, short-term contrarian effect is also explained by 
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overreaction as Bacmann and Dubois (1998) test it on the French market, which is 
supported by Mun et al. (1999) investigating the French and German market. 
     Another possible explanation for contrarian effect is documented as “size-
dependent lead-lag structure” or “cross effects among the securities” by Lo and 
Mackinlay (1990). They suggest that some stocks react more quickly than the 
others, resulting in “return of large stock generally leads those of smaller ones”, 
which explains more than 50% of abnormal return gained by the contrarian 
investment rule. Given the fact that individual security return is negatively 
autocorrelated while the market index is positively autocorrelated, if some stock 
(A) obtained higher return previously cross-autocorrelated with some other stock 
(B), the contrarian strategy (buy loser and sell winner) benefits with no existence 
of market overreaction. However, their suggestion is refuted by Jegadeesh and  
Titman (1995). They discompose the contrarian profits and find out that stock 
price delay reacts to common factors and overreact to firm-specific information. 
The size-related lead-lag effect arises only when investor delay reactions to 
common factors. They conclude that overreaction to firm-specific information is 
the main contribution to contrarian profits.  
    A Third source of contrarian profits can be time-varying common factors. As 
was highlighted in the research conducted by Conrad and Kaul (1998), cross-
sectional dispersion in the mean return of individual securities (which consisting 
in the portfolio traded) varying by time is the important determinant for short-
term contrarian profits. In determining the long-term contrarian profits, Chan 
(1988) suggests that both the risk of individual stock (represented by beta) and the 
market risk premium change along time, which give rises to reverting mean of 
expected return. And prior loser have higher risk later implying higher expected 
return, from which contrarian strategies benefit. Zarowin (1990) reports firm-size 
discrepancy is the main reason for long-term contrarian profits. It is documented 
that prior loser can outperform winner because it is of smaller size but not 
overreaction. Some other reasons lay on measurement error due to bid-ask spread, 
nonsynchronous trading and liquidity as reported by Park (1995), Ball et al. 
(1995), Conrad et al. (1997).  
    Similarly, interpretations of momentum profits are widely debated. Among 
those the main idea is either behavioral bias that investors irrationally react to 
information and tend to act in a “herd-like manner” when information is released; 
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or data snooping bias. Behavioral theory related to cognitive bias have been 
attempted by Barberis et al. (1998) and Dan- iel et al. (1998). To achieve the same 
goal, Hong and Stein (1997) focus on Asian market and categorize investors into 
“newswatchers” and “momentum traders”. In their theory, newswatchers 
underreact to information in short run, which is being taken advantage by 
momentum traders to drive up the price and earn substantial return. In the long 
run, price is overshoot and beyond the equilibrium value. It is the interaction 
between traders causes the short-term momentum profits. Among those herding 
effect is well documented. For example, by investigating the institutional 
investors (mutual funds) in the US market, Grinblatt et al. (1995) suggests that 
herding behavior significantly related to the performance of the funds. Funds tend 
to invest in portfolio of stocks based on the their past result. As De Long et al. 
(1990) points out, funds are “positive-feedback traders” who invest in stocks have 
performed well. In Grinblatt’s paper, they also find that funds tend to trade 
simultaneously with same direction, which pushes up the prices. This result 
explains intermediate-term momentum strategies.  
    As newly developed a behavioral bias, disposition effect as termed by Shefrin 
and Statman (1985), is found explanatory to momentum strategy in Grinblatt and 
Han (2005). Disposition is described as investors tend to sell winners too quickly 
and keep losers too long. And if to some extent disposition effect exists with 
investors, stocks with aggregate unrealized capital gains tend to outperform stocks 
with aggregate unrealized capital losses. Enhance, disposition effect may account 
for momentum profits. Hur et al. (2010) point out that disposition effect seems to 
be stronger within individual investors dominant market.  
    Moreover, to interpret the intermediate-term momentum profits, another source 
is belonging to market inefficiency due to time-varying common factors or data 
mining. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) report that higher-risk stocks are contained 
in prior winner results in which higher expected return in the intermediate term.  
Enhance, the profits are compensation to the risk. While Conrad and Kaul (1998) 
suggest cross-sectional differences in mean returns give rises to intermediate 
momentum profits. However, their suggestion is refuted by Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2000), which eventually confirms the delayed overreaction theory. After that, 
Choria and Shivakumar  (2000) control the momentum strategies by lagged 
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macroeconomic variables and find that payoffs disappear. They conclude that 
time-varying expected return is the main reason for momentum profits.  
 
2. Research Questions and Objectives  
    In this thesis, we aim to investigate various contrarian strategies and 
momentum strategies in China market for basically four motivations. First of all, 
the main land China (excludes Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan)，with population 
of 13.4 billion9, ranks the second largest economies in the world (ahead of Japan 
which GDP is $5.50 million and after the U.S.) with GDP $5.88 million10 in 2010. 
GDP growth rate is 10.3%, listing the 6th place in the world behind Taiwan 
(10.8%) and India (10.4%)11. Total trade becomes $2.97 billion12, making China 
the second trade union in the world after the U.S. The importance of China market 
to the global economy is recognized and much accounted. Researches in China 
stock market may give rises to understand the development of global economy. 
As the most important emerging market, China is in need of more investigation 
from year to year as it is developing so fast. Despite prior Chinese-market studies 
discussed previously in the paper, a stylized explanation of contrarian and 
momentum profits is waiting to be developed.  
    What’s more, even though China has been a member of WTO since 11 
December 2001, the integration of China stock market and the global market 
remains weak. Byströma (2011)13 reports that China’s stock market has much 
weaker reaction to the global news. Sharma (2011) 14  examines the Asian 
economies and documented China is the least positively related to the US market.  
Although China market is no longer negatively related to the U.S. market as 
                                                
9 National Bureau of Statistics of China, the 6th national census of population results, 28 April 
2011 
10 World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 1 July 2011 
11 GDP (real) growth rate list by the CIA World Factbook 
12 PRC National Bureau of Statistics， 2010 year report, 28 February 2011  
13 Byström, Hans. Does the Chinese stock market react to global news? Journal of the Asia Pacific 
Economy Vol. 16, Iss. 3, 2011 
14 Sharma, Preeti . Asian Emerging Economies and United States of America: Do they offer a 
diversification? Australian Journal of Business and Management Research. Vol.1,  Iss.4, (85-92) 
2011 
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indicated in Kang et al. (2002), if China market is not perfectly correlated to the 
U.S. securities, it will provides diversification benefits for international investors. 
Hence, the investigation of proper investment strategy in China stock market is 
still attractive and interesting to the global investors and researchers.  
    In addition, China stock market is a special market. In its first ten years, it was 
interpreted as “stir-frying stocks” for stock trading in China. Kang et al. (2002) 
and Hu (1999) point out that individual investors, which have unique practice, 
dominate China stock market.  And the characteristics of the market can be 
summarized as: 1. Poor regulation and little reliable public information; 2. Few 
products and little variety for choosing. Individual investors lacking of trading 
experience and solid knowledge about capital market tend to believe in rumors 
around the market. Such a different behavior leading to overreaction to the news 
followed by a quick correction seems to contribute most for the short-term 
contrarian. What’s more, investors experience herding effect, which makes 
persistent stock return causing possible momentum effect. Kang et al. (2002) also 
suggest that syndicate speculators are much easier to manipulate the sentiment in 
small stocks, giving rises for return of small firms lead returns of large firms. As 
shown in the SZSE Fact Book 2009, individual investors are still the dominance 
of China stock market despite that the percentage of institutional investors is 
increasing throughout the years.  We have confidence that the unique practice 
remains unchanged but any difference due to market development is an interesting 
question.  
   Last but not the least, the past 10 years is the second decade of China stock 
market since the establishment of two stock exchanges in 1990 and 1991. Since 
2001, much changes and development is observed in the China stock market. 
Government regulations are gradually standardized and improved. For example, 
Shenzhen, Shanghai Stock Exchange IPO regulation is exercised in 8th June 2001. 
Also, in the same year, Shenzhen, Shanghai Stock Exchange Trading Rules is 
exercised. In 2004, multi-layer capital market system was developed with the 
establishment of middle and small firm market sector in Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. Moreover, product variety is increased. B shares are opened for 
domestic investors, which are limited to foreign investors only prior 2001. The 
first open-end fund was traded in 2001. Also, index futures were established for 
trading and short selling is allowed for it in 2010. With these changes, we cannot 
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deny that the China stock market is getting more and more regulated, transparent 
and mature. As Kang et al. (2002) says, “the profitability of contrarian strategies 
(and, to a less extent, momentum strategies) will dissipate as the market becomes 
mature and more transparent in the future,” we are expecting to see different 
results in this investigation.  
    The rest of this preliminary thesis report is organized as: we discuss the data 
collection plan and sample selection. Then methodologies regarding identification 
of abnormal profits as well as the examination of alternative sources are presented. 
Finally, it is our plan for thesis progression.  
 
3. Plan for Data Collection 
3.1 The data for conducting the research of momentum/contrarian effects 
Following the methodology described by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and 
Kang et al (2002), the weekly stock return of both “A” shares (satisfied 
requirements below) from December 2001 to November 2011 are to be retrieved 
from DataStream. We will start from Monday, December 3, 2001 and ends at 
Monday, November 28, 2011. In order to implement intermediate-term and long-
term momentum strategies, our sample is going to exclude the firms that were 
delisted during the sample period, and include in it only the firms that have been 
trading since December 3, 2001. So all the firms included must have continuous 
trading throughout the sample period, namely ten years (i.e. any firm with missing 
data for any reason would be excluded). We are also going to exclude the IPOs 
that were listed on December 3, 2001, since the first trading days for IPOs are 
normally so volatile that it may distort the findings in our short term momentum 
and contrarian strategies. There were 1160 firms that were listed in the China 
stock market (both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges) and hopefully we 
will still have a sample size large enough for research purpose after all the 
requirements. 
However, there is possibility that we may end up with a sample size not 
sufficient for our studies. There is a backup plan: the sample is going to include 
the firms that had been listed for at least 5 years prior to November 2011 and 
exclude those listed in or after 2006. According to the statistics from the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, the numbers of firms listed in both Shanghai 
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and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges since 2005 is 1381. Therefore even taking into 
consideration of the firms that are delisted, we still have a sample size large 
enough for our research. However, in this case, the first week return of any newly 
listed company is eliminated because of the substantial underpricing and irregular 
returns in IPOs in China (see Sun and Tong, 2000), so that to make the result 
more reliable.  
In order to test for the financial crises period, whether any specific strategy may 
capture abnormal return, we plan to use subsamples: December 2001 to 
November 2006, and December 2006 to November 2011. The comparison 
between subsamples and entire sample may generate interesting results.   
 
3.2 Possible additional data needed for explaining the momentum/contrarian 
effects 
    According to Kang et al (2002), the contrarian and momentum profits in China 
could be linked to four factors: (1) measurement error; (2) time-varying market 
risk; (2) overreaction to firm-specific information and (4) lead-lag structure in 
stock returns. To investigate whether the four points raised by Kang et al (2002) 
still have explanatory power for our sample period, we determine that we need the 
following additional data: 
• Weekly	  market	  return	  from	  December	  2001	  to	  November	  2011:	  proxy	  by	  Shanghai	  
“A”	   share	   Index15	  and	   Shenzhen	   “A”	   share	   Index16,	   depending	   on	  which	  market	   is	  
the	  stock	  listed	  on，can	  be	  obtained	  from	  DataStream.	  
• Weekly	   risk-­‐free	  rate:	   from	  December	  2001	  to	  7th	  October	  2006,	   it	   represented	  by	  
China	   one-­‐year	   deposit	   rates	   that	   are	   accessible	   through	   The	   People’s	   Bank	   of	  
China.17	  Since	  8th	  October	  2006,	  Shanghai	   Interbank	  Offered	  Rate	  (Shibor)18	  is	  used	  
                                                
15 Shanghai “A” share Index was formed by Shanghai Stock Exchange with sample of all the ”A” 
shares listed. The base year is 1990. It was first published in Febuary,1992. 
16 Shenzhen “A” share Index was formed by Shenzhen Stock Exchange with sample of all the ”A” 
shares listed. The base year is 1991. It was first published in October,1992. 
17 The People’s Bank of China. http://www.pbc.gov.cn/ 
18 Shibor is calculated, announced and named on the technological platform of the National 
Interbank Funding Center in Shanghai. It’s shared information with 16 commercial banks in China 
since October 2006. http://www.shibor.org/shibor/web/html/index_e.html 
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instead19	  until	   the	   end	   of	   our	   sample	   period.	   Shibor	   data	   can	   be	   collected	   on	   its	  
website.	  	  
• Market	  value/capitalization	  figure	  of	  each	  listed	  company	  during	  the	  sample	  period:	  
data	  can	  be	  collected	  from	  DataStream	  as	  the	  fundamental	  information.	  	  
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Test of momentum and contrarian profits 
    To test the existence of momentum and contrarian profits. Portfolios are formed 
based on the methodology employed in Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1995), and Kang et. al (2002). We first rank the stock returns during the F-
week portfolio formation period in an ascending order. We plan to examine 10 
formation periods, thus F=1, 2, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 26, 52.  Five equal-size quintiles are 
then formed. The portfolio with the highest equal-weighted average stock returns is 
the winner portfolio and the lowest is then the loser portfolio. The quintiles in 
between the loser and winner portfolios are given number orders in ascending order 
(2, 3, 4). Second, each quintile portfolio under various formation periods is also held 
for a H-week holding period. We consider using the same horizons in the formation 
period as in the holding period, thus H=1, 2, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 26, 52. By then, a F-H 
strategy is formed. As we each have 9 time horizons for both formation (F) and 
holding (H) periods, we are going to have 81 (9x9) different investment strategies. 
Lastly, an equal-weighted average portfolio return for holding period is calculated for 
each F-H strategy. The quintile with the highest return in each strategy is selected as 
the winner portfolio currently whereas the lowest one is named the loser portfolio 
currently. The difference between the returns of winner and the loser portfolio (L - W) 
is calculated and reported. If the difference is significantly different from zero and it 
is positive, we can conclude that momentum profits exist. And if it is significantly 
negative, then contrarian strategy is profitable. Similarly, value-weighted average 
portfolio return is also calculated for comparison purpose and check our whether 
firm-size effect was considerable. 
                                                
19 The change of the data target as the risk-free rate may raise inconsistency problem. However, 
since one-year deposit rate changes as the PBC announces a new rate at certain date in a year, it  
 
remains constant otherwise. We find Shibor more consist with the economic fluctuation from time 
to time even though it was newly developed.  
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    To make it clearer, here is an example. If F=1 and H=1, we will start from the first 
week of our sample and find out winner and loser portfolio by sorting stock returns as 
described above. Then the returns of these portfolios for the next week (holding 
period is one week) are calculated. Then this process is carried over starting with the 
second week of our sample until the last but second week of our sample. By repeating 
the process continuously, a number of current winner returns and loser returns will be 
generated. Then we take average of them. By comparing average winner and loser 
returns, we can conclude whether this F,H (1,1) strategy generate momentum or 
contrarian profits.  If then for F=1, and H=4, we also start from the first week. But the 
holding period will be from the second week to the fifth week, totally four weeks. 
The process as discussed above is carried over a long time. While F=4, and H=1 
implies formation period is the first four weeks and followed by one week holding 
period.  
    To avoid the possible measurement error that may arise from bid-ask spread, price 
pressure due to illiquid markets, and non-synchronous data, one trading day between 
portfolio formation and holding periods for all investment strategies will be skipped 
(Kang et al., 2002; for similar treatment, see Chan et al., 1999; Lehmann, 1990). For 
instance in the formation period, a week may beings on Tuesday and ends on the 
following Wednesday (if the Wednesday is not a trading day, then the next trading 
date is used). Then for the holding period, a week begins on Wednesday and ends on 
Thursday (if Wednesday is not a trading day, then we will use the next trading day). 
To be more robust, we might try skipping one week in between as well.  
 
4.2 Examine the effect of time-varying market risk to abnormal profits 
Once we find out what time horizon strategies can generate abnormal profits, 
we will focus on these strategies and test for each alternatives sources as 
discussed in the objectives in session 2.  
Chan (1988) proposes that the common factors for winner and loser stocks are 
not constant over time. He finds that only small abnormal profits exist for 
contrarian strategies as losers tend to be riskier and winners tend to be less risky 
in the holding periods. He also proposes the following model to investigate 
whether time-varying market risk plays a significant role in explaining the 
contrarian and momentum profits: 
,      (1) ( ) tftMtftpt rrrr εβα +−+=− ( )LWP ,∈
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,               (2) 
                (3) 
Where rpt is the portfolio return at time t (t is those time in formation period), rft is 
the risk-free rate at time t, rMt is the market index return at time t, rMt - rft is the 
market risk premium at time t, α and β are the intercept and slope (market beta) 
coefficients, rLT is loser’s return at time T (T is those time in holding period), rWT 
is winner’s return at time T. The superscripts c and m refer to contrarian and 
momentum strategies, respectively. If the betas are significantly different for 
winner portfolio and loser portfolio in all the strategies, then beta risk contributes 
to abnormal returns in these strategies. Kang et at (2002) follows model (Chan, 
1988) to investigate whether the time-varying risk plays an important role in the 
momentum/contrarian effect in the China stock market from 1993 to 2000. Their 
results lead to the conclusion that the beta risk alone cannot explain the contrarian 
and momentum profits they found in the same period. 
 
4.3 Examine the effect of overreaction and lead-lag structure to abnormal 
profits 
Based on the idea illustrated by DeBondt and Thaler (1985), overreaction effect 
causes negative serial autocorrelation of individual security. To test whether 
overreaction effect has influence the abnormal return, we tend to follow the 
method used by Kang et al. (2002). For each strategy tested to be profitable, we 
will construct 5 size-sorted quintile portfolios of stocks based on stock’s 
capitalization at initial portfolio formation time. The quintiles are presented as S1 
(the smallest stocks) to S5 (the largest stocks). For example, if F-H (1,1) 
contrarian strategy is tested profitable, then under this strategy, stocks under each 
quintile will go through the process as firstly to be defined as winner or loser in 
the formation period; secondly to be held for the holding period and see how 
much profits (returns) can be obtain by contrarian strategy. Such returns construct 
a serial under each quintile over time. Then correlation between each quintile 
return and its own one-week lagged return (own-serial autocorrelation) as well as 
the one-week lagged return of other four quintiles respectively (cross-serial 
autocorrelation) was calculated. Later, a 5×5 correlation matrix is formed. If 
negative own-serial autocorrelation is dominant, then it indicates an overreaction 
( ) TfTMTccWTLT rrrr εβα +−+=−
( ) tfTMTmmLTWT rrrr εβα +−+=−
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to firm-specific news. And if the result is positive, then we can conclude a witness 
of delayed reaction.  
    Moreover, by checking the cross-serial autocorrelation, we can see whether 
smaller stock’s return is leading the larger stock’s return. If it is significantly 
positive, for example, the correlation of S1 to lagged S5, then we can confirm the 
previous hypothesis.  
 
4.4 Decomposition by one-factor model 
    Lo and Mackinlay (1990) propose that the lead-lag structure is an important 
source contrarian profits, whereas Jegadeesh and Timan (1995) find no evidence 
for lead-lag structure in the U.S. market. J. Kang et al. (2002) indicates that the 
lead-lag structure in China may be an important source of momentum profits, but 
not of contrarian profits. We will follow the method developed by Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990) and Jegadeesh and Timan (1995) to decompose the profit 
sources for contrarian and momentum strategies. Firstly, a one-factor lagged 
model is used to describe individual stock i’s return: 
                                     (4) 
Where !!  is the unconditional expected return of stock portfolio i, !!  is the 
unexpected common factor at time t. In the context of Kang et al (2002), the 
market index return obtained from Eq. (1) is used as a proxy for the common 
factor. We plan to follow Kang et al (2002) if we find momentum/contrarian 
effects in the China stock market for the period we investigate but we will use the 
market index as described in data session. !!,!!  and !!,!!  are ith stock’s current and 
lagged betas, respectively. The assumption is that if the one-factor model with 
one-period lag can explain the stock return and if the past market return can will 
explain a portion of the excess return of the stock, then the expected contrarian 
and momentum profits can be decomposed as follows (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990): 
      (5) 
          (6) 
Where 
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                                                  (7) 
                                                  (8)  
,                            (9) 
According to Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), there are three components for the expected 
contrarian profits and momentum profits. The first (σ!!) is the cross-sectional 
variance of expected returns. For contrarian strategies (Eq. 5), higher average 
return hurt the contrarian profits while the same component increases momentum 
profits.  The second component Ω is the cross-sectional average serial covariance 
of idiosyncratic component of individual stock returns. The component represents 
the magnitude of overreaction to firm specific information. The last component 
δσ!! is the lead-lag structure. If δ<0, then the lead-lag structure has a positive 
effect on contrarian profits and negative effect on momentum profits, or vice-
versa. We will report all of the three ( ,  and ) for all our quintile portfolios 
and thus the magnitude of the overreaction effect as well as the size-related lead-
lag structure can also be quantified and compared. 
 
5. Proposed Thesis progression 
Our plan is to divide our research into 4 parts in this year: 
1) First part is the data collection. We plan to finish all the data collection by February 29, 
2012. 
2) We will start to form portfolios and construct momentum and contrarian portfolios in the 
second part. The results will be reported by April 30, 2012. A basic write-up about this 
part will also be finished by the same day. 
3) In the third phase we are going to finish exploring the results from our findings in the 
momentum and contrarian portfolios (i.e. examination of alternative explanatory sources 
and decomposition return) by June 30, 2012. 
4) In the last part we are going to finish all the write-up by July 31, 2012 and any grammar 
mistakes or minor mistakes need to be checked in the rest one month.  
 
The purpose of having the thesis divided into parts and deadlines is to monitor the 
progress of the thesis and make sure we can consult and report to our supervisors. 
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